육군사관학교 학술정보원검색
- Home
- 기능목록
- 검색
-
Marc 보기
MARC 닫기
-
LDR
00000nam c2200205 c 4500
-
001
000001538627
-
005
20260226092913
-
008
260218s2011 us a b 001c0 eng d
-
020
▼a 9780521134132
▼c $39 -
040
▼a DLC
▼c DLC
▼d YDX
▼d YDXCP
▼d BWX
▼d CDX
▼d DLC
▼d 211009
▼d 211047 -
090
▼a 338.6094
▼b C89q -
100
▼a Culpepper, Pepper D.
-
245
▼a Quiet politics and business power :
▼b corporate control in Europe and Japan /
▼d Pepper D. Culpepper. -
260
▼a New York :
▼b Cambridge University Press,
▼c 2011. -
300
▼a xviii, 221 p. :
▼b ill. ;
▼c 25 cm. -
440
▼a Cambridge studies in comparative politics
-
504
▼a Includes bibliographical references (p. 199-213) and index.
-
505
▼a Machine generated contents note: 1. Corporate control and political salience; 2. Patient capital and markets for corporate control; 3. The managerial origins of institutional divergence in France and Germany; 4. The Netherlands and the myth of the corporatist coalition; 5. Managers, bureaucrats, and institutional change in Japan; 6. The noisy politics of executive pay; 7. Business power and democratic politics.
-
520
▼a "Does democracy control business, or does business control democracy? This study of how companies are bought and sold in four countries - France, Germany, Japan, and the Netherlands - explores this fundamental question"--Provided by publisher.
-
520
▼a "Does democracy control business, or does business control democracy? This study of how companies are bought and sold in four countries, France, Germany, Japan, and the Netherlands, explores this fundamental question. It does so by examining variation in the rules of corporate control ,specifically, whether hostile takeovers are allowed. Takeovers have high political stakes: they result in corporate reorganizations, layoffs, and the unraveling of compromises between workers and managers. But the public rarely pays attention to issues of corporate control. As a result, political parties and legislatures are largely absent from this domain. Instead, organized managers get to make the rules, quietly drawing on their superior lobbying capacity and the deference of legislators. These tools, not campaign donations, are the true founts of managerial political influence"--Provided by publisher.
-
650
▼a Corporate governance
▼z Europe. -
650
▼a Corporate governance
▼z Japan. -
990
▼b 주제분류담당
-
991
▼a 단행본
-
LDR
- 바구니담기
- 내서재 담기
- 내보내기
상세정보
Quiet politics and business power : corporate control in Europe and Japan
QR코드| 자료유형 : | 단행본 |
|---|---|
| ISBN : | 9780521134132 |
| 분류기호 : | 338.6094 |
| 개인저자 : | Culpepper, Pepper D. |
| 서명/저자사항 : | Quiet politics and business power : corporate control in Europe and Japan / Pepper D. Culpepper. |
| 발행사항 : | New York : Cambridge University Press, 2011. |
| 형태사항 : | xviii, 221 p. : ill. ; 25 cm. |
| 총서사항 : | Cambridge studies in comparative politics |
| 서지주기 : | Includes bibliographical references (p. 199-213) and index. |
| 내용주기 : | Machine generated contents note: 1. Corporate control and political salience; 2. Patient capital and markets for corporate control; 3. The managerial origins of institutional divergence in France and Germany; 4. The Netherlands and the myth of the corporatist coalition; 5. Managers, bureaucrats, and institutional change in Japan; 6. The noisy politics of executive pay; 7. Business power and democratic politics. |
| 요약 : | "Does democracy control business, or does business control democracy? This study of how companies are bought and sold in four countries - France, Germany, Japan, and the Netherlands - explores this fundamental question"--Provided by publisher. |
| 요약 : | "Does democracy control business, or does business control democracy? This study of how companies are bought and sold in four countries, France, Germany, Japan, and the Netherlands, explores this fundamental question. It does so by examining variation in the rules of corporate control ,specifically, whether hostile takeovers are allowed. Takeovers have high political stakes: they result in corporate reorganizations, layoffs, and the unraveling of compromises between workers and managers. But the public rarely pays attention to issues of corporate control. As a result, political parties and legislatures are largely absent from this domain. Instead, organized managers get to make the rules, quietly drawing on their superior lobbying capacity and the deference of legislators. These tools, not campaign donations, are the true founts of managerial political influence"--Provided by publisher. |
| 일반주제명 : | Corporate governance -- Europe. -- |
| 일반주제명 : | Corporate governance -- Japan. -- |
| 언어 | 영어 |
예약
- 1. 예약현황은 홈페이지 로그인 후 예약 페이지에 확인 가능합니다.
- 2. 도착 통보된 예약자료 대출을 원하지 않는 경우에는 예약 현황에서 취소할 수 있습니다.
- 3. 기타 문의사항은 도서관에 문의 바랍니다.
무인예약대출
- 1. 무인예약대출 현황은 홈페이지 로그인 후 무인예약대출 페이지에 확인 가능합니다.
- 2. 무인예약대출자료 대출을 원하지 않는 경우에는 무인예약대출 페이지에서 신청 또는 접수상태인 경우만 취소할 수 있습니다.
- 3. 희망대출일은 신청일로부터 최대 1주일 까지 가능합니다.
- 4. 희망대출일을 선택하지 않은 경우 대출대기 통보 후 1주일까지 기기에서 대출가능합니다.
- 5. 기타 문의사항은 도서관에 문의 바랍니다.
백범일지 : 백범 김구 자서전 / 재판
324.2092 김17ㅂ2
백범일지 : 백범 김구 자서전 / 개정판
324.2092 김17ㄷ2
중국의 초한전 : 새로운 전쟁의 도래
324.252 이79ㅈ
나의 월급 독립 프로젝트
332.6322 유35ㄴ
(20대 의사 달물결의) 미국 주식 투자 : 시간·돈·꿈을 잃지 않는 투자법
332.6322 문53ㅁ
이병한의 테크노-차이나 탐문
306.0952 이44ㅇ
헌법개론 / 제15판
342 성211허15
중국과 러시아 : 불편한 우정의 역사
327.52047 우238ㅈ
돈의 대폭발 : 경제 공식이 바뀐다
332.46 손79ㄷ
파이프라인 = Pipeline
337 이812ㅍ
서평쓰기