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00655nam ac200205 k 4500
000003858899
20220101120000
ta
050204s2004 us 000 eng
▼a 069111739X
▼a 123456
▼c 123456
▼d 211070
▼l WM6333
▼a JA79
▼a JA79
▼b P353
▼a Parker,Glenn R
▼a Self-Policing in Politics:
▼b the political economy of reputational controls on politicians/
▼d Parker,Glenn R.
▼a Princeton:
▼b Princeton Univ.,
▼c 2004.
▼a 180p.;
▼c 24cm.
▼a Political ethics
▼a Economic aspects
▼a Political corruption
▼a Self-control
▼a Legislators
▼a United States
▼b US$36
▼a 단행본
| 자료유형 : | 단행본 |
|---|---|
| ISBN : | 069111739X |
| 분류기호 : | JA79 |
| 개인저자 : | Parker,Glenn R |
| 서명/저자사항 : | Self-Policing in Politics: the political economy of reputational controls on politicians/ Parker,Glenn R. |
| 발행사항 : | Princeton: Princeton Univ., 2004. |
| 형태사항 : | 180p.; 24cm. |
| 언어 | 영어 |
Introduction
1. What is Opportunism and How Do We Control It?
2. How Reputations Control Cheating in Economics and Politics
3. Problems in the Market for Legislators
4. Hypotheses, Measurement, and Data
5. Constraining Opportunism through Self-Policing
6. Reputational Capital and Job Security : or, If Trustworthy Legislators Are at a Premium, Are They Paid One?
7. Weaknesses in Reputational Controls
Conclusion
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