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000005128705
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20240127183840
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231123s2019 gaua b s001c0 eng c
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▼a 9780820355634 (hardcover : alk. paper)
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040
▼a 211070
▼c 211070
▼d 211070 -
050
▼a U264
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090
▼a U264
▼b H299 -
245
▼a Behavioral economics and nuclear weapons /
▼d edited by Anne I. Harrington,
▼e Jeffrey W. Knopf. -
260
▼a Athens :
▼b The University of Georgia Press,
▼c 2019 -
300
▼a xii, 214 pages :
▼b illustrations ;
▼c 24 cm -
490
▼a Studies in security and international affairs ;
▼v 28 -
504
▼a Includes bibliographical references and index
-
505
▼a Introduction: Applying insights from behavioral economics to nuclear decision making / Jeffrey W. Knopf and Anne I. Harrington -- Testing a cognitive theory of deterrence / Jeffrey D. Berejikian and Florian Justwan -- Disabling deterrence and preventing war : decision making at the end of the nuclear chain / Janice Gross Stein and Morielle I. Lotan -- The neurobiology of deterrence : lessons for U.S. and Chinese doctrine / Nicholas Wright -- Apocalypse now : rational choice before the unthinkable / Jean-Pierre Dupuy -- Sanctions, sequences, and statecraft : insights from behavioral economics / Etel Solingen -- Justice and the nonproliferation regime / Harald Müller -- Constructing U.S. ballistic missile defense : an information processing account of technology innovation / Zachary Zwald -- Homo atomicus : an actor worth psychologizing? : the problems of applying behavioral economics to nuclear strategy / Anne I. Harrington and John Downer.
-
520
▼a "Recent discoveries in psychology and neuroscience have improved our understanding of why our decision making processes fail to match standard social science assumptions about rationality. As researchers such as Daniel Kahneman, Amos Tversky, and Richard Thaler have shown, people often depart in systematic ways from the predictions of the rational actor model of classic economic thought because of the influence of emotions, cognitive biases, an aversion to loss, and other strong motivations and values. These findings about the limits of rationality have formed the basis of behavioral economics, an approach that has attracted enormous attention in recent years. This collection of essays applies the insights of behavioral economics to the study of nuclear weapons policy. Behavioral economics gives us a more accurate picture of how people think and, as a consequence, of how they make decisions about whether to acquire or use nuclear arms. Such decisions are made in real-world circumstances in which rational calculations about cost and benefit are intertwined with complicated emotions and subject to human limitations. Strategies for pursuing nuclear deterrence and nonproliferation should therefore, argue the contributors, account for these dynamics in a systematic way. The contributors to this collection examine how a behavioral approach might inform our understanding of topics such as deterrence, economic sanctions, the nuclear nonproliferation regime, and U.S. domestic debates about ballistic missile defense. The essays also take note of the limitations of a behavioral approach for dealing with situations in which even a single deviation from the predictions of any model can have dire consequences"--
▼c Provided by publisher -
650
▼a Nuclear weapons
▼x Economic aspects -
650
▼a Economics
▼x Psychological aspects -
650
▼a Nuclear weapons
▼x Government policy -
650
▼a Deterrence (Strategy)
-
650
▼a Nuclear nonproliferation
-
650
▼a Military policy
▼x Decision making -
650
▼a Economic policy
▼x Decision making -
700
▼a Harrington, Anne
▼q (Anne I.),
▼e editor -
700
▼a Knopf, Jeffrey W.,
▼e editor -
700
▼a edited by Anne I. Harrington and Jeffrey W. Knopf
-
830
▼a Studies in security and international affairs ;
▼v 28 -
950
▼b $54.95
-
991
▼a 단행본
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상세정보
Behavioral economics and nuclear weapons
QR코드| 자료유형 : | 단행본 |
|---|---|
| ISBN : | 9780820355634 (hardcover : alk. paper) |
| 분류기호 : | U264 |
| 서명/저자사항 : | Behavioral economics and nuclear weapons / edited by Anne I. Harrington, Jeffrey W. Knopf. |
| 발행사항 : | Athens : The University of Georgia Press, 2019 |
| 형태사항 : | xii, 214 pages : illustrations ; 24 cm |
| 총서사항 : | Studies in security and international affairs ; 28 |
| 서지주기 : | Includes bibliographical references and index |
| 내용주기 : | Introduction: Applying insights from behavioral economics to nuclear decision making / Jeffrey W. Knopf and Anne I. Harrington -- Testing a cognitive theory of deterrence / Jeffrey D. Berejikian and Florian Justwan -- Disabling deterrence and preventing war : decision making at the end of the nuclear chain / Janice Gross Stein and Morielle I. Lotan -- The neurobiology of deterrence : lessons for U.S. and Chinese doctrine / Nicholas Wright -- Apocalypse now : rational choice before the unthinkable / Jean-Pierre Dupuy -- Sanctions, sequences, and statecraft : insights from behavioral economics / Etel Solingen -- Justice and the nonproliferation regime / Harald Müller -- Constructing U.S. ballistic missile defense : an information processing account of technology innovation / Zachary Zwald -- Homo atomicus : an actor worth psychologizing? : the problems of applying behavioral economics to nuclear strategy / Anne I. Harrington and John Downer. |
| 요약 : | "Recent discoveries in psychology and neuroscience have improved our understanding of why our decision making processes fail to match standard social science assumptions about rationality. As researchers such as Daniel Kahneman, Amos Tversky, and Richard Thaler have shown, people often depart in systematic ways from the predictions of the rational actor model of classic economic thought because of the influence of emotions, cognitive biases, an aversion to loss, and other strong motivations and values. These findings about the limits of rationality have formed the basis of behavioral economics, an approach that has attracted enormous attention in recent years. This collection of essays applies the insights of behavioral economics to the study of nuclear weapons policy. Behavioral economics gives us a more accurate picture of how people think and, as a consequence, of how they make decisions about whether to acquire or use nuclear arms. Such decisions are made in real-world circumstances in which rational calculations about cost and benefit are intertwined with complicated emotions and subject to human limitations. Strategies for pursuing nuclear deterrence and nonproliferation should therefore, argue the contributors, account for these dynamics in a systematic way. The contributors to this collection examine how a behavioral approach might inform our understanding of topics such as deterrence, economic sanctions, the nuclear nonproliferation regime, and U.S. domestic debates about ballistic missile defense. The essays also take note of the limitations of a behavioral approach for dealing with situations in which even a single deviation from the predictions of any model can have dire consequences"-- Provided by publisher |
| 일반주제명 : | Nuclear weapons -- Economic aspects -- |
| 일반주제명 : | Economics -- Psychological aspects -- |
| 일반주제명 : | Nuclear weapons -- Government policy -- |
| 일반주제명 : | Deterrence (Strategy) -- |
| 일반주제명 : | Nuclear nonproliferation -- |
| 일반주제명 : | Military policy -- Decision making -- |
| 일반주제명 : | Economic policy -- Decision making -- |
| 개인저자 : | Harrington, Anne (Anne I.), editor |
| 개인저자 : | Knopf, Jeffrey W., editor |
| 개인저자 : | edited by Anne I. Harrington and Jeffrey W. Knopf |
| 언어 | 영어 |
예약
- 1. 예약현황은 홈페이지 로그인 후 예약 페이지에 확인 가능합니다.
- 2. 도착 통보된 예약자료 대출을 원하지 않는 경우에는 예약 현황에서 취소할 수 있습니다.
- 3. 기타 문의사항은 도서관에 문의 바랍니다.
무인예약대출
- 1. 무인예약대출 현황은 홈페이지 로그인 후 무인예약대출 페이지에 확인 가능합니다.
- 2. 무인예약대출자료 대출을 원하지 않는 경우에는 무인예약대출 페이지에서 신청 또는 접수상태인 경우만 취소할 수 있습니다.
- 3. 희망대출일은 신청일로부터 최대 1주일 까지 가능합니다.
- 4. 희망대출일을 선택하지 않은 경우 대출대기 통보 후 1주일까지 기기에서 대출가능합니다.
- 5. 기타 문의사항은 도서관에 문의 바랍니다.
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