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THE STUDY OF EFFECTIVE RESPONSE OF SOUTH KOREA AGAINST COERCION OF NORTH KOREA’S NUCLEAR THREAT = 북한 핵 강압전략에 대한 한국의 효과적 대응전략에 대한 연구

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자료유형 :	(군대학) 학위논문
분류기호 :	393.8
서명/저자사항 :	THE STUDY OF EFFECTIVE RESPONSE OF SOUTH KOREA AGAINST COERCION OF NORTH KOREA’S NUCLEAR THREAT = 북한 핵 강압전략에 대한 한국의 효과적 대응전략에 대한 연구/ 임기훈
발행사항 :	논산 : 국방대학교 국방관리대학원, 2024
형태사항 :	107 p. ; 26 cm
총서사항 :	석사학위논문
일반주기 :	지도교수: James C. Moltz
일반주기 :	미국 해군대학원 논문 발행일: 2024.12.
학위논문주기 :	Thesis(M.A.) -- Naval Postgraduate School, Arts in security studies(STRATEGIC STUDIES) , 2025.7
학위논문주기 :	학위논문 (석사) -- 국방대학교 국방관리대학원, 군사전략전공, 2025.7
서지주기 :	참고문헌수록
개인저자 :	Huntley, Wade L.
개인저자 :	Weiner, Robert J.
개인저자 :	Kihun, Im
단체저자명 :	국방대학교. 국방관리대학원
단체저자명 :	Naval Postgraduate School
언어	영어

소장정보

예예약
인인쇄
SSMS
서서가부재
보보존서고
우우선정리예약
무무인예약대출

예약

1. 예약현황은 홈페이지 로그인 후 예약 페이지에 확인 가능합니다.
2. 도착 통보된 예약자료 대출을 원하지 않는 경우에는 예약 현황에서 취소할 수 있습니다.
3. 기타 문의사항은 도서관에 문의 바랍니다.

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무인예약대출

1. 무인예약대출 현황은 홈페이지 로그인 후 무인예약대출 페이지에 확인 가능합니다.
2. 무인예약대출자료 대출을 원하지 않는 경우에는 무인예약대출 페이지에서 신청 또는 접수상태인 경우만 취소할 수 있습니다.
3. 희망대출일은 신청일로부터 최대 1주일 까지 가능합니다.
4. 희망대출일을 선택하지 않은 경우 대출대기 통보 후 1주일까지 기기에서 대출가능합니다.
5. 기타 문의사항은 도서관에 문의 바랍니다.

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REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB
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1. AGENCY USE ONLY
(Leave blank) 2. REPORT DATE
December 2024 3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED
Master’s thesis
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE
THE STUDY OF EFFECTIVE RESPONSE OF SOUTH KOREA AGAINST
COERCION OF NORTH KOREA’S NUCLEAR THREAT
5. FUNDING NUMBERS
6. AUTHOR(S) Kihun Im
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, CA 93943- 5000
8. PERFORMING
ORGANIZATION REPORT
NUMBER
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND
ADDRESS(ES)
N/A
10. SPONSORING /
MONITORING AGENCY
REPORT NUMBER
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the
official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
Distribution Statement A. Approved for public
release: Distribution is unlimited.
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE
A
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)
This thesis analyzes the long-term balance of coercion between South Korea and North Korea. By
engaging with coercion theory, it seeks to develop a theoretical framework to better understand this dynamic.
North Korea’s advancement in nuclear capabilities could significantly bolster its coercive leverage. However,
South Korea’s independent efforts, coupled with its strong alliance with the United States, mitigates this effect.
The thesis introduces and applies key concepts of coercion, particularly escalation dominance and
pressure points. Using these concepts, it evaluates the effectiveness of strategies and offers policy implications
to address the balance of coercion on the Korean Peninsula.
The critical findings indicate that North Korea has not achieved escalation dominance relative to South
Korea and the United States. Furthermore, it has failed to effectively exploit its nuclear weapons to target
South Korea’s pressure points. In contrast, South Korea, with U.S. backing, has demonstrated a greater
likelihood of achieving escalation dominance and has successfully leveraged its advantages to exploit North
Korea’s vulnerabilities.
These findings provide valuable insights into how South Korea and the United States can further address
North Korea’s attempts at nuclear coercion, highlighting strategies for maintaining and enhancing their
strategic posture.
14. SUBJECT TERMS
coercion theory, North Korea nuclear coercion, theoretical framework, escalation
dominance, independent nuclear weapon development
15. NUMBER OF
PAGES
137
16. PRICE CODE
17. SECURITY
CLASSIFICATION OF
REPORT
Unclassified
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CLASSIFICATION OF THIS
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