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260601s2025 us a b 001c0 eng c
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▼a 9780674976085
▼q cloth -
020
▼z 9780674300811
▼q epub -
020
▼z 9780674300804
▼q pdf -
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▼a (KERIS)REF000020888536
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▼a MH/DLC
▼b eng
▼c DLC
▼d MH/DLC
▼d DLC-MRC
▼d DLC
▼d DLC-MRC
▼d DLC
▼e rda
▼d 211070 -
042
▼a pcc
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050
▼a JZ5687
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090
▼a JZ5687
▼b W754 -
245
▼a Strange stability :
▼b how Cold War scientists set out to control the arms race and ended up serving the military-industrial complex /
▼d Benjamin Wilson -
260
▼a Cambridge, Massachusetts :
▼b Harvard University Press,
▼c 2025 -
300
▼a 478 p. :
▼b illustrations,;
▼c 25 cm -
504
▼a Includes bibliographical references (pages 367-457) and index
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505
▼a The Myth of Technocratic Restraint -- Stabilizing Deterrence -- Destabilizing Disarmament -- Concealing Conflicts -- Prioritizing Research -- Performing Opposition -- Deflecting Responsibility -- Narrowing Debate -- "My Scientists"
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520
▼a "Strategic stability is admired as the basis of arms control, but the doctrine is not what is commonly assumed. Benjamin T. Wilson shows that its early promoters falsely asserted their own objectivity and developed a logic that actually perpetuated the nuclear arms race, benefiting the military-industrial complex that commanded their loyalty."-- Provided by publisher
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650
▼a Nuclear arms control
▼x History
▼y 20th century -
650
▼a Deterrence (Strategy)
▼x History
▼y 20th century -
650
▼a Scientists
▼z United States
▼x Attitudes
▼x History
▼y 20th century -
650
▼a Military-industrial complex
▼x History
▼y 20th century -
650
▼a Nuclear crisis stability
▼x History
▼y 20th century -
650
▼a Cold War
▼0 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh88005637 -
700
▼a Wilson, Benjamin T.,
▼d 1982-,
▼e author
▼4 aut
▼4 http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut
▼0 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/no2025051706
▼1 http://id.loc.gov/rwo/agents/no2025051706 -
950
▼b $49.95
-
991
▼a 단행본
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Detailed Information
Strange stability : how Cold War scientists set out to control the arms race and ended up serving the military-industrial complex
QR Code| Data Type : | 단행본 |
|---|---|
| ISBN : | 9780674976085 |
| ISBN : | |
| ISBN : | |
| Class No. : | JZ5687 |
| Title/Author : | Strange stability : how Cold War scientists set out to control the arms race and ended up serving the military-industrial complex / Benjamin Wilson |
| Imprint : | Cambridge, Massachusetts : Harvard University Press, 2025 |
| Format : | 478 p. : illustrations,; 25 cm |
| Note : | Includes bibliographical references (pages 367-457) and index |
| Content Note : | The Myth of Technocratic Restraint -- Stabilizing Deterrence -- Destabilizing Disarmament -- Concealing Conflicts -- Prioritizing Research -- Performing Opposition -- Deflecting Responsibility -- Narrowing Debate -- "My Scientists" |
| 요약 : | "Strategic stability is admired as the basis of arms control, but the doctrine is not what is commonly assumed. Benjamin T. Wilson shows that its early promoters falsely asserted their own objectivity and developed a logic that actually perpetuated the nuclear arms race, benefiting the military-industrial complex that commanded their loyalty."-- Provided by publisher |
| General Subject Name : | Nuclear arms control -- History -- 20th century -- |
| General Subject Name : | Deterrence (Strategy) -- History -- 20th century -- |
| General Subject Name : | Scientists -- United States -- Attitudes -- History -- 20th century -- |
| General Subject Name : | Military-industrial complex -- History -- 20th century -- |
| General Subject Name : | Nuclear crisis stability -- History -- 20th century -- |
| General Subject Name : | Cold War -- |
| Personal Author : | Wilson, Benjamin T., 1982-, author |
| Language | English |
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- 5. 기타 문의사항은 도서관에 문의 바랍니다.
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