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00570nam ac200193 k 4500
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20220101120000
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010731s1970 US 000 eng
▼a 0674840313
▼a 211070
▼c 211070
▼d 123456
▼l WM0003013007
▼l WM0004005284
▼c 2
▼l WM5191
▼c 3
▼l WM5586
▼c 4
▼a BF637.N4
▼a BF637.N4
▼b S3
▼a SCHELLING,THOMAS C.
▼a THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT/
▼d SCHELLING,THOMAS C
▼a CAMBRIDGE:
▼b HARVARD UNIV.,
▼c 1960.
▼a 309p.;
▼c 21cm.
▼a Negotiation
▼a Games of Strategy (Mathematics)
▼a 단행본
| 자료유형 : | 단행본 |
|---|---|
| ISBN : | 0674840313 |
| 분류기호 : | BF637.N4 |
| 개인저자 : | SCHELLING,THOMAS C. |
| 서명/저자사항 : | THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT/ SCHELLING,THOMAS C |
| 발행사항 : | CAMBRIDGE: HARVARD UNIV., 1960. |
| 형태사항 : | 309p.; 21cm. |
| 언어 | 영어 |
WMO199914888
권 호 : 309p.
발행년 : 1960
발행처 : HARVARD UNIV.
서 명 : THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT
목차
I. Elements of a Theory of Strategy
1. The Retarded Science of International Strategy
2. An Essay on Bargaining
3. Bargaining, Communication, and Limited War
II. A Reorientation of Game Theory
4. Toward a Theory of Interdependent Decision
5. Enforcement, Communication, and Strategic Moves
6. Game Theory and Experimental Research
III. Strategy With a Random Ingredient
7. Randomization of Promises and Threats
8. The Threat That Leaves Something to Chance
IV. Surprise Attack : A Study in Mutual Distrust
9. The Reciprocal Fear of Surprise Attack
10. Surprise Attack and Disarmament
Appendices
A. Nuclear Weapons and Limited War
B. For the Abandonment of Symmetry in Game Theory
C. Re-interpretation of a Solution Concept for "Noncooperative" Games
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