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  ▼a  985364208
  ▼a  994462923
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  ▼a  1002022533

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  ▼a  1400885736
  ▼q  (ebk)

• 020

  ▼a  9781400885732

• 020

  ▼z  0691171734

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  ▼z  9780691171739

• 035

  ▼a  1471556
  ▼b  (N$T)

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  ▼a  (OCoLC)1003934450
  ▼z  (OCoLC)985364208
  ▼z  (OCoLC)994462923
  ▼z  (OCoLC)999649927
  ▼z  (OCoLC)1002022533

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  ▼a  MAIN

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  ▼a  HQ519
  ▼b  .C46 2017eb

• 082

  ▼a  306.85
  ▼2  23

• 100

  ▼a  Chiappori, Pierre-Andr?e,
  ▼e  author.

• 245

  ▼a  Matching with transfers
  ▼h  [electronic resource]:
  ▼b  the economics of love and marriage/
  ▼d  Pierre-Andr?e Chiappori..

• 260

  ▼a  Princeton:
  ▼b  Princeton University Press,
  ▼c  2017.

• 300

  ▼a  1 online resource (xvi, 241 pages):
  ▼b  illustrations.

• 336

  ▼a  text
  ▼b  txt
  ▼2  rdacontent

• 337

  ▼a  computer
  ▼b  c
  ▼2  rdamedia

• 338

  ▼a  online resource
  ▼b  cr
  ▼2  rdacarrier

• 490

  ▼a  The Gorman Lectures in Economics

• 504

  ▼a  Includes bibliographical references and index.

• 505

  ▼t  Frontmatter --
  ▼t  Contents --
  ▼t  Preface --
  ▼t  Acknowledgments --
  ▼t  1. Introduction: Matching Models in Economics --
  ▼t  2. Matching with Transfers: Basic Notions --
  ▼t  3. Matching under Transferable Utility: Theory --
  ▼t  4. Matching by Categories --
  ▼t  5. Matching under Transferable Utility: Some Extensions --
  ▼t  6. Matching under Transferable Utility: Applications --
  ▼t  7. Matching under Imperfectly Transferable Utility --
  ▼t  8. Conclusion --
  ▼t  References --
  ▼t  Index

• 520

  ▼a  Over the past few decades, matching models, which use mathematical frameworks to analyze allocation mechanisms for heterogeneous products and individuals, have attracted renewed attention in both theoretical and applied economics. These models have been used in many contexts, from labor markets to organ donations, but recent work has tended to focus on "nontransferable" cases rather than matching models with transfers. In this important book, Pierre-André Chiappori fills a gap in the literature by presenting a clear and elegant overview of matching with transfers and provides a set of tools that enable the analysis of matching patterns in equilibrium, as well as a series of extensions. He then applies these tools to the field of family economics and shows how analysis of matching patterns and of the incentives thus generated can contribute to our understanding of long-term economic trends, including inequality and the demand for higher education.

• 588

  ▼a  Print version record.

• 650

  ▼a  Families
  ▼x  Economic aspects.

• 776

  ▼i  Print version:,
  ▼z  9781400885732

• 830

  ▼a  Gorman lectures in economics.

• 856

  ▼3  EBSCOhost
  ▼u  http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&db=nlabk&AN=1471556

• 990

  ▼a  강리원
  ▼b  강리원

• 991

  ▼a  eBook