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  01509nam a2200301 c 4500

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  000000776087

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  20151119153324

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  100907s2010 nyu b 001 0 eng d

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  ▼a  2009030372

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  ▼a  9780801447853 (cloth : alk. paper)

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  ▼a  9780801478062

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  ▼a  243002

• 100

  ▼a  Jervis, Robert,
  ▼d  1940-.

• 245

  ▼a  Why intelligence fails :
  ▼b  lessons from the Iranian Revolution and the Iraq War/
  ▼c  Robert Jervis.

• 260

  ▼a  Ithaca:
  ▼b  Cornell University Press,
  ▼c  2010.

• 300

  ▼a  238 p.;
  ▼c  25 cm.

• 490

  ▼a  Cornell studies in security affairs

• 504

  ▼a  Includes bibliographical references (p. 197-227) and index.

• 505

  ▼a  Adventures in intelligence -- Failing to see that the Shah was in danger : introduction, postmortem, and CIA comments -- Analysis of NFAC's performance on Iran's domestic crisis, mid-1977-7 November 1978 -- CIA comments on the report -- The Iraq WMD intelligence failure : what everyone knows is wrong -- The politics and psychology of intelligence and intelligence reform.

• 610

  ▼a  United States.
  ▼b  Central Intelligence Agency
  ▼x  Evaluation
  ▼v  Case studies.

• 650

  ▼a  Intelligence service
  ▼z  United States
  ▼x  Evaluation
  ▼v  Case studies.

• 650

  ▼a  Weapons of mass destruction
  ▼z  Iraq.

• 651

  ▼a  Iran
  ▼x  History
  ▼y  Revolution, 1979.

• 651

  ▼a  Iraq War, 2003-
  ▼x  Military intelligence
  ▼z  United States
  ▼x  Evaluation.

• 830

  ▼a  Cornell studies in security affairs.

• 991

  ▼a  단행본

• 090

  ▼a  955.053
  ▼b  J57w