MARC 닫기

• LDR

  00000nam c2200205 c 4500

• 001

  000001208578

• 005

  20260226092913

• 008

  260218s2011 us a b 001c0 eng d

• 020

  ▼a  9780521134132
  ▼c  $39

• 040

  ▼a  DLC
  ▼c  DLC
  ▼d  YDX
  ▼d  YDXCP
  ▼d  BWX
  ▼d  CDX
  ▼d  DLC
  ▼d  211009
  ▼d  211047

• 090

  ▼a  338.6094
  ▼b  C89q

• 100

  ▼a  Culpepper, Pepper D.

• 245

  ▼a  Quiet politics and business power :
  ▼b  corporate control in Europe and Japan /
  ▼d  Pepper D. Culpepper.

• 260

  ▼a  New York :
  ▼b  Cambridge University Press,
  ▼c  2011.

• 300

  ▼a  xviii, 221 p. :
  ▼b  ill. ;
  ▼c  25 cm.

• 440

  ▼a  Cambridge studies in comparative politics

• 504

  ▼a  Includes bibliographical references (p. 199-213) and index.

• 505

  ▼a  Machine generated contents note: 1. Corporate control and political salience; 2. Patient capital and markets for corporate control; 3. The managerial origins of institutional divergence in France and Germany; 4. The Netherlands and the myth of the corporatist coalition; 5. Managers, bureaucrats, and institutional change in Japan; 6. The noisy politics of executive pay; 7. Business power and democratic politics.

• 520

  ▼a  "Does democracy control business, or does business control democracy? This study of how companies are bought and sold in four countries - France, Germany, Japan, and the Netherlands - explores this fundamental question"--Provided by publisher.

• 520

  ▼a  "Does democracy control business, or does business control democracy? This study of how companies are bought and sold in four countries, France, Germany, Japan, and the Netherlands, explores this fundamental question. It does so by examining variation in the rules of corporate control ,specifically, whether hostile takeovers are allowed. Takeovers have high political stakes: they result in corporate reorganizations, layoffs, and the unraveling of compromises between workers and managers. But the public rarely pays attention to issues of corporate control. As a result, political parties and legislatures are largely absent from this domain. Instead, organized managers get to make the rules, quietly drawing on their superior lobbying capacity and the deference of legislators. These tools, not campaign donations, are the true founts of managerial political influence"--Provided by publisher.

• 650

  ▼a  Corporate governance
  ▼z  Europe.

• 650

  ▼a  Corporate governance
  ▼z  Japan.

• 990

  ▼b  주제분류담당

• 991

  ▼a  단행본