MARC 닫기

• LDR

  00000cam c2200205uc 4500

• 001

  000001210950

• 005

  20260331145007

• 007

  ta

• 008

  260211s2025 us b 000c1 eng

• 020

  ▼a  9780197770382
  ▼q  paperback

• 020

  ▼a  9780197770375
  ▼q  hardback

• 020

  ▼z  9780197770405
  ▼q  epub

• 020

  ▼z  9780197770412

• 035

  ▼a  (KERIS)REF000020892718

• 040

  ▼a  DLC
  ▼b  eng
  ▼c  DLC
  ▼d  DLC
  ▼d  DLC-MRC
  ▼d  DLC
  ▼d  DLC-MRC
  ▼d  211070
  ▼e  rda

• 042

  ▼a  pcc

• 050

  ▼a  UG447

• 090

  ▼a  UG447
  ▼b  M829

• 245

  ▼a  Coercing Syria on chemical weapons :
  ▼b  a case study of deterrence and coercive diplomacy /
  ▼d  Matthew Moran

• 246

  ▼a  Case study of deterrence and coercive diplomacy

• 260

  ▼a  New York, NY :
  ▼b  Oxford University Press,
  ▼c  2025

• 300

  ▼a  x, 264 p. ;
  ▼c  24 cm

• 490

  ▼a  Bridging the gap

• 504

  ▼a  Includes bibliographical references and index

• 520

  ▼a  "This book examines efforts by the United States, sometimes acting with France and the UK, to respond to Syria's possession and use of chemical weapons (CW) during that country's civil war. The responses, across the otherwise very different presidencies of Barack Obama and Donald Trump, relied heavily on coercion. Policies directed at the ruling Assad regime in Syria attempted to deter CW attacks and to compel Syria into giving up its chemical arsenal. Outcomes were mixed. Efforts to deter CW use failed multiple times, but these failures were punctuated by partial success in getting Syria to sign the Chemical Weapons Convention and give up much of its CW capability - even if Assad's forces did eventually resume CW attacks. This book draws on existing literature on deterrence and coercive diplomacy to identify three propositions - involving credibility, motivations, and assurances - that help explain this mixed record of coercive success and failure. The analysis derives policy lessons that might prove helpful should a situation similar to Syria arise in the future. We conclude that the United States and its partners did not achieve greater success in part because they relied on what we call the "resolve plus bombs" formula - a belief that talking tough and threatening or using air power would be sufficient to make coercive strategies effective. We suggest that a strategy more tailored to address Assad's concerns with regime survival would have had the potential to more effectively deter CW use"-- Provided by publisher

• 650

  ▼a  Chemical weapons
  ▼z  Syria

• 650

  ▼a  Chemical arms control
  ▼z  Syria

• 650

  ▼a  Chemical arms control
  ▼x  International cooperation

• 651

  ▼a  Syria
  ▼x  History
  ▼x  Diplomatic history
  ▼y  Civil War, 2011-

• 700

  ▼a  Moran, Matthew,
  ▼c  (College teacher),
  ▼e  author

• 700

  ▼a  Bowen, Wyn Q.,
  ▼e  author

• 700

  ▼a  Knopf, Jeffrey W.,
  ▼e  author

• 830

  ▼a  Bridging the gap

• 950

  ▼b  $99

• 991

  ▼a  단행본