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  ▼a  0691196982
  ▼q  (electronic book)

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  ▼a  9780691196985
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  ▼a  2087844
  ▼b  (N$T)

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  ▼a  (OCoLC)1111951009

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  ▼a  MAIN

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  ▼a  HG1725
  ▼b  .T83 2019

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  ▼a  332.1/1
  ▼2  23

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  ▼a  Tucker, Paul M. W.,
  ▼d  1958-,
  ▼e  author.

• 245

  ▼a  Unelected Power:
  ▼b  the Quest for Legitimacy in Central Banking and the Regulatory State /:
  ▼c  Paul Tucker.
  ▼h  [electronic resource].

• 260

  ▼a  Princeton, New Jersey:
  ▼b  Princeton University Press,
  ▼c  2019.

• 300

  ▼a  1 online resource (663 pages).

• 336

  ▼a  text
  ▼b  txt
  ▼2  rdacontent

• 337

  ▼a  computer
  ▼b  c
  ▼2  rdamedia

• 338

  ▼a  online resource
  ▼b  cr
  ▼2  rdacarrier

• 504

  ▼a  Includes bibliographical references and index.

• 505

  ▼t  Frontmatter --
  ▼t  Contents --
  ▼t  Preface to the Paperback --
  ▼t  Preface --
  ▼t  1. Introduction: Power, Welfare, Incentives, Values --
  ▼t  PART I. Welfare: THE PROBLEM, AND A POSSIBLE SOLUTION --
  ▼t  2. The Evolution of the Administrative State --
  ▼t  3. The Purposes and Functional Modes of the Administrative State --
  ▼t  4. The Structure of the Administrative State --
  ▼t  5. Principles for Whether to Delegate to Independent Agencies --
  ▼t  6. Design Precepts for How to Delegate to Independent Agencies --
  ▼t  7. Applying the Principles for Delegation --
  ▼t  PART II. Values: DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY FOR INDEPENDENT AGENCIES --
  ▼t  8. Independent Agencies and Our Political Values and Beliefs (1) --
  ▼t  9. Independent Agencies and Our Political Values and Beliefs (2) --
  ▼t  10. Credible Commitment versus Democracy --
  ▼t  11. The Political- Values- and- Norms Robustness Test of the Principles for Delegation --
  ▼t  12. Insulated Agencies and Constitutionalism --
  ▼t  PART III. Incentives: THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE IN THE REAL WORLD: INCENTIVES AND VALUES UNDER DIFFERENT CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURES --
  ▼t  13. States' Capacity for Principled Delegation to Deliver Credible Commitment --
  ▼t  14. The Problem of Vague Objectives --
  ▼t  15. Processes, Transparency, and Accountability --
  ▼t  16. The Limits of Design --
  ▼t  PART IV. Power: Overmighty Citizens? THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CENTRAL BANKING: POWER, LEGITIMACY, AND RECONSTRUCTION --
  ▼t  17. Central Banking and the Politics of Monetary Policy --
  ▼t  18. The Shift in Ideas --
  ▼t  19. Tempting the Gods --
  ▼t  20. A Money-Credit Constitution --
  ▼t  21. Central Banking and the Regulatory State --
  ▼t  22. Central Banking and the Fiscal State --
  ▼t  23. Central Banks and the Emergency State --
  ▼t  24. Overmighty Citizens After All? --
  ▼t  Conclusion. Unelected Democrats --
  ▼t  APPENDIX --
  ▼t  ACKNOWLEDGMENTS --
  ▼t  BIBLIOGRAPHY --
  ▼t  INDEX

• 520

  ▼a  "Unelected Power lays out the principles needed to ensure that central bankers and other independent regulators act as stewards of the common good. Blending economics, political theory, and public law, this critically important book explores the necessary conditions for delegated but politically insulated power to be legitimate in the eyes of constitutional democracy and the rule of law. It explains why the solution must fit with how real-world government is structured, and why technocrats and their political overseers need incentives to make the system work as intended. Now with a new preface by Paul Tucker, Unelected Power explains how the regulatory state need not be a fourth branch of government free to steer by its own lights, and how central bankers can emulate the best of judicial self-restraint"--
  ▼c  Provided by publisher.

• 588

  ▼a  Online resource; title from digital title page (viewed on September 18, 2019).

• 590

  ▼a  Added to collection customer.56279.3

• 650

  ▼a  Banks and banking
  ▼x  State supervision.

• 650

  ▼a  Banking law.

• 650

  ▼a  Financial institutions
  ▼x  Government policy.

• 650

  ▼a  Monetary policy.

• 650

  ▼a  BUSINESS & ECONOMICS
  ▼x  Government & Business.
  ▼2  bisacsh

• 650

  ▼a  Banking law.
  ▼2  fast
  ▼0  (OCoLC)fst00826811

• 650

  ▼a  Banks and banking
  ▼x  State supervision.
  ▼2  fast
  ▼0  (OCoLC)fst00826996

• 650

  ▼a  Financial institutions
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• 650

  ▼a  Monetary policy.
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  ▼0  (OCoLC)fst01025230

• 655

  ▼a  Electronic books.

• 776

  ▼i  Print version:
  ▼a  Tucker, Paul.
  ▼t  Unelected Power : The Quest for Legitimacy in Central Banking and the Regulatory State.
  ▼d  Princeton : Princeton University Press, ©2019,
  ▼z  9780691196305

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  ▼a  De Gruyter
  ▼b  DEGR
  ▼n  9780691196985

• 938

  ▼a  ProQuest Ebook Central
  ▼b  EBLB
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• 938

  ▼a  Project MUSE
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