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  ▼a  1109771885

• 020

  ▼a  9780192567208
  ▼q  (electronic bk.)

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  ▼a  0192567209
  ▼q  (electronic bk.)

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  ▼a  9780192567192
  ▼q  (electronic bk.)

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  ▼a  0192567195
  ▼q  (electronic bk.)

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  ▼z  0198831498

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  ▼z  9780198831495

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  ▼a  2201920
  ▼b  (N$T)

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  ▼a  (OCoLC)1109441651
  ▼z  (OCoLC)1109771885

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  ▼a  YDX
  ▼b  eng
  ▼c  YDX
  ▼d  N$T
  ▼d  OCLCF
  ▼d  EBLCP
  ▼d  248023
  ▼d  YDXIT
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  ▼a  MAIN

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  ▼a  BT741.3
  ▼b  .S95 2019

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  ▼a  128/.1
  ▼2  23

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  ▼a  Swinburne, Richard.

• 245

  ▼a  Are we bodies or souls? /
  ▼c  Richard Swinburne.

• 250

  ▼a  First edition.

• 260

  ▼a  Oxford, United Kingdom ;
  ▼a  New York, NY:
  ▼b  Oxford University Press,
  ▼c  2019.

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  ▼a  1 online resource.

• 336

  ▼a  text
  ▼b  txt
  ▼2  rdacontent

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  ▼a  computer
  ▼b  c
  ▼2  rdamedia

• 338

  ▼a  online resource
  ▼b  cr
  ▼2  rdacarrier

• 504

  ▼a  Includes bibliographical references and index.

• 505

  ▼a  Cover; Are We Bodies or Souls?; Copyright; Contents; 1: Introduction; A. What This Book Is About; B. The Problem of Personal Identity; C. The Plan of This Book; 2: Physicalism and Property Dualism; A. Human Beings; B. Substances, Properties, and Events; C. Physicalism; D. Property Dualism; E. The Different Kinds of Pure Mental Events; F. Physical and Mental Substances; 3: Theories of Personal Identity; A. Different Kinds of Complex Theories of Personal Identity; B. The Strong Body Theory of Personal Identity; C. The Strong Brain Theory of Personal Identity

• 505

  ▼a  D. Mental and Mixed Theories of Personal IdentityE. Objections to All Strong Complex Theories of Personal Identity; F. Partial Identity Theories of Personal Identity; G. Weak Complex Theories of Personal Identity; H. The Simple Theory of Personal Identity; 4: Descartes's Argument for the Soul; A. The Principle of the Identity of Composites; B. Descartes's Original Argument; C. My Amended Version of Descartes's Argument; D. Aquinas's Theory of the Relation of Soul and Body; 5: We Know Who We Are; A. Informative and Uninformative Designators; B. Informative Designators of Mental Properties

• 505

  ▼a  C. Informative Designators of Mental SubstancesD. Each Human Soul Has Its Own Thisness; Appendix on 'Metaphysical Modality'; 6: Souls and Bodies Interact; A. Brain Events Often Cause Pure Mental Events; B. Rational Belief; C. Pure Mental Events Often Cause Other Mental Events; D. Pure Mental Events Often Cause Brain Events; E. The Libet Programme; 7: Could Science Explain Souls?; A. Cartesian Substance Dualism and the Evidence for It, Summarized; B. When Does a Human Soul Begin and Cease to Exist?; C. Is the Same Human Body Normally Connected to the Same Soul?

• 505

  ▼a  D. When Does the Soul Cease to Exist?E. Could There Be a Scientific Explanation of the Existence and Life of the Soul?; F. Which Non-Human Organisms Have Souls?; G. The Limit to Scientific Explanation of Souls; Notes; 1. Introduction; 2. Physicalism and Property Dualism; 3. Theories of Personal Identity; 4. Descartes's Argument for the Soul; 5. We Know Who We Are; 6. Souls and Bodies Interact; 7. Could Science Explain Souls?; Guide to Further Reading; Index

• 520

  ▼a  What are humans? What makes us who we are? Many think that we are just complicated machines, or animals that are different from machines only by being conscious. In Are We Bodies or Souls? Richard Swinburne comes to the defence of the soul and presents new philosophical arguments that are supported by modern neuroscience. When scientific advances enable neuroscientists to transplant a part of brain into a new body, he reasons, no matter how much we can find out about their brain activity or conscious experiences we will never know whether the resulting person is the same as before or somebody entirely new. Swinburne thus argues that we are immaterial souls sustained in existence by our brains. Sensations, thoughts, and intentions are conscious events in our souls that cause events in our brains. While scientists might discover some of the laws of nature that determine conscious events and brain events, each person's soul is an individual thing and this is what ultimately makes us who we are.

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  ▼a  Description based on online resource; title from digital title page (viewed on September 11, 2019).

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  ▼a  Master record variable field(s) change: 050

• 650

  ▼a  Mind and body.

• 650

  ▼a  Human beings.

• 650

  ▼a  Persons.

• 650

  ▼a  Neurosciences.

• 650

  ▼a  Soul.

• 650

  ▼a  Human beings.
  ▼2  fast
  ▼0  (OCoLC)fst00962832

• 650

  ▼a  Mind and body.
  ▼2  fast
  ▼0  (OCoLC)fst01021997

• 650

  ▼a  Neurosciences.
  ▼2  fast
  ▼0  (OCoLC)fst01036509

• 650

  ▼a  Persons.
  ▼2  fast
  ▼0  (OCoLC)fst01058861

• 650

  ▼a  Soul.
  ▼2  fast
  ▼0  (OCoLC)fst01432098

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  ▼a  Electronic books.

• 655

  ▼a  Electronic books.

• 776

  ▼i  Print version:
  ▼a  Swinburne, Richard
  ▼t  Are We Bodies or Souls?.
  ▼d  Oxford : Oxford University Press USA - OSO,c2019,
  ▼z  9780198831495

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  ▼3  EBSCOhost
  ▼u  https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&db=nlabk&AN=2201920

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  ▼a  YBP Library Services
  ▼b  YANK
  ▼n  16362422

• 938

  ▼a  EBSCOhost
  ▼b  EBSC
  ▼n  2201920

• 938

  ▼a  EBL - Ebook Library
  ▼b  EBLB
  ▼n  EBL5825855

• 990

  ▼a  최영란

• 991

  ▼a  eBook

• 994

  ▼a  92
  ▼b  N$T