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▼a 9780674976085
▼q cloth
▼z 9780674300811
▼q epub
▼z 9780674300804
▼q pdf
▼a (KERIS)REF000020888536
▼a MH/DLC
▼b eng
▼c DLC
▼d MH/DLC
▼d DLC-MRC
▼d DLC
▼d DLC-MRC
▼d DLC
▼e rda
▼d 211070
▼a pcc
▼a JZ5687
▼a JZ5687
▼b W754
▼a Strange stability :
▼b how Cold War scientists set out to control the arms race and ended up serving the military-industrial complex /
▼d Benjamin Wilson
▼a Cambridge, Massachusetts :
▼b Harvard University Press,
▼c 2025
▼a 478 p. :
▼b illustrations,;
▼c 25 cm
▼a Includes bibliographical references (pages 367-457) and index
▼a The Myth of Technocratic Restraint -- Stabilizing Deterrence -- Destabilizing Disarmament -- Concealing Conflicts -- Prioritizing Research -- Performing Opposition -- Deflecting Responsibility -- Narrowing Debate -- "My Scientists"
▼a "Strategic stability is admired as the basis of arms control, but the doctrine is not what is commonly assumed. Benjamin T. Wilson shows that its early promoters falsely asserted their own objectivity and developed a logic that actually perpetuated the nuclear arms race, benefiting the military-industrial complex that commanded their loyalty."-- Provided by publisher
▼a Nuclear arms control
▼x History
▼y 20th century
▼a Deterrence (Strategy)
▼x History
▼y 20th century
▼a Scientists
▼z United States
▼x Attitudes
▼x History
▼y 20th century
▼a Military-industrial complex
▼x History
▼y 20th century
▼a Nuclear crisis stability
▼x History
▼y 20th century
▼a Cold War
▼0 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh88005637
▼a Wilson, Benjamin T.,
▼d 1982-,
▼e author
▼4 aut
▼4 http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut
▼0 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/no2025051706
▼1 http://id.loc.gov/rwo/agents/no2025051706
▼b $49.95
▼a 단행본
| 자료유형 : | 단행본 |
|---|---|
| ISBN : | 9780674976085 |
| ISBN : | |
| ISBN : | |
| 분류기호 : | JZ5687 |
| 서명/저자사항 : | Strange stability : how Cold War scientists set out to control the arms race and ended up serving the military-industrial complex / Benjamin Wilson |
| 발행사항 : | Cambridge, Massachusetts : Harvard University Press, 2025 |
| 형태사항 : | 478 p. : illustrations,; 25 cm |
| 서지주기 : | Includes bibliographical references (pages 367-457) and index |
| 내용주기 : | The Myth of Technocratic Restraint -- Stabilizing Deterrence -- Destabilizing Disarmament -- Concealing Conflicts -- Prioritizing Research -- Performing Opposition -- Deflecting Responsibility -- Narrowing Debate -- "My Scientists" |
| 요약 : | "Strategic stability is admired as the basis of arms control, but the doctrine is not what is commonly assumed. Benjamin T. Wilson shows that its early promoters falsely asserted their own objectivity and developed a logic that actually perpetuated the nuclear arms race, benefiting the military-industrial complex that commanded their loyalty."-- Provided by publisher |
| 일반주제명 : | Nuclear arms control -- History -- 20th century -- |
| 일반주제명 : | Deterrence (Strategy) -- History -- 20th century -- |
| 일반주제명 : | Scientists -- United States -- Attitudes -- History -- 20th century -- |
| 일반주제명 : | Military-industrial complex -- History -- 20th century -- |
| 일반주제명 : | Nuclear crisis stability -- History -- 20th century -- |
| 일반주제명 : | Cold War -- |
| 개인저자 : | Wilson, Benjamin T., 1982-, author |
| 언어 | 영어 |
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